The notion that cultural characterics influence political regimes remains popular, despite mixedsupporting evidence. In particular, democracy is argued to emerge and thrive in countries where liberal or freedom-oriented values (so-called self-expression values) are widespread. Inglehart and Welzel (2005), for instance, report such an effect, mainly drawing inferences from cross-country comparisons. Yet, cross-country correlations between selfexpression values and democracy could stem from different processes. Reinvestigating this relationship, we find no empirical support when employing models accounting for sampleselection bias, country-specific effects, and the endogeneity of values to democracy. Selfexpression values do not enhance democracy levels or democratization chances, and neither do they stabilize existing democracies. In contrast, we find indications that a country's experience with democracy enhances self-expression values.
Introduction
Does democratization or democratic stability critically depend on certain cultural characteristics, i.e. that the citizenry holds particular values and beliefs? The literature counts several "culturalist" explanations of democracy, or lack thereof. German, Italian and Japanese cultural characteristics were previously argued to inhibit well-functioning democratic regimes; 1 but, following decades of democratic consolidation after WWII, these arguments have lost in popularity. Likewise, some scholars have argued that cultural characteristics of different African, Middle Eastern and East Asian countries do not square easily with democracy.
2 Yet, such culturalist explanations are often drawn from quite limited or selective observations, and fare poorly when evaluated against more systematic evidence. 3 Still, there exists a more refined cultural explanation of democracy that relates not to some stable national or religious characteristic, but rather, more universally, to the extension of liberal, freedom-oriented, or so-called self-expression values. Below, we reinvestigate this proposed relationship, but find no support for any causal effect of self-expression values on democracy.
Instead we highlight how their correlation may be explained by democracy -which often emerges from coups or international interventions -gradually inducing the "learning" of selfexpression values within the population.
Despite having previously been contested by important contributions, 4 the self-expression values explanation of democracy remains commonly acknowledged. 5 Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel have presented a widely cited (almost 2800 Google Scholar citations on their 1 E.g., Almond and Verba 1963; Lipset 1959, 87. 2 E.g., Huntington 1997.
3 Gassebner et al. 2012; Teorell 2010 . 4 Hadenius and Teorell 2005; Jackman and Miller 1996; Muller and Seligson 1994; Seligson 2002. 5 See Clark, Golder and Golder 2012; Coppedge 2012; Wucherpfennig and Deutsch 2009 for reviews. democratization. The high correlation between self-expression values and democracy levels could rather be due to different demographic, political-historical or socio-economic factors systematically influencing both values and regime type. The correlation could also come from democratic institutions affecting values, at least -as our results below indicate -in the longer run. We add to the literature by designing empirical tests that account for such issues, and thus contribute to resolving a long-standing debate on whether self-expression values causally determine chances of democratization or democratic survival. Previous contributions have highlighted that the positive effect of values on regime type is sensitive, for example, to choice of democracy measure and other specification issues such as lag length on independent variables. 9 Still, previous studies have relied on very limited data material and -by current standards -fairly crude model specifications. 10 We employ multiple imputation to correct for potential sample-selection biases and use panel data techniques in order to better deal with omitted variable bias and endogeneity of selfexpression values. We also run models that account for the slow-moving nature of political regimes and, particularly, self-expression values. In sum, we find no evidence that selfexpression values cause democracy. Moreover, self-expression values neither enhances democratization chances nor democratic survival. Further, we do not find effects from any sub-components of self-expression values, such as generalized trust. Rather, we find that values are endogenous to countries' experiences with democracy, corroborating the so-called institutional learning hypothesis. This has implications for debates on the viability of "democracy withouth democrats", i.e. whether democratization and subsequent consolidation, are possible without democratic political cultures. 11 Our findings suggests that not only can 9 Teorell and Hadenius 2006.
10 But, see Abdollahian et al. 2012. 11 Salame 1994; Lindberg 2006 democracy emerge and endure without democrats -democracy breeds democrats in the long run. Thus, we propose that i) democratization processes are spurred by other factors than selfexpression values, and ii) the observed cross-country correlation partly reflects democracy affecting popular values.
We first review the argument that self-expression values enhance democracy, before presenting our alternative theoretical account, our data and design, and finally the empirical analysis.
Self-expression values as a force for democracy; the argument
Numerous scholars have proposed that popular values -while not necessarily exogenousaffect political regime type. For instance, almost 200 years ago, de Tocqueville postulated that democracy in the United States reflected the liberal orientations of the American people, which, in turn, were a function of particular historical and socio-economic conditions. 12 After WWII, sociological and psychological work elaborated on variations in individual "democratic predispositions". For example, Adorno and colleagues introduced the "authoritarian personality" -rooted in perceptions of threats nurturing low self-esteem, misanthropy and dogmatic rigidity, whereas Maslow proposed two democratic orientations, namely emphasis on self-actualization and humanistic inclinations to consider others as equals. 13 Further, Almond and Verba argued that stable democracies require a civic culture, "a pluralistic culture based on communication and persuasion, a culture of consensus and diversity, a culture that permitted change but moderated it". 14 As noted, values are not 12 De Tocqueville [1835] 1955.
13 Adorno et al. 1950; Maslow 1954. 14 Almond and Verba 1963, 6. exogenously given, and economic development is often considered a key factor in creating more tolerant, liberal, freedom-oriented, or simply "democratic" citizens. 15 Lipset, for instance, argues that improved educational attainment -related to economic developmentmakes people more tolerant towards opposition and minorities, in turn promoting democracy.
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More recently, IW proposed their "Revised Theory of Modernization" (RTM), the current Collective action motivated by such aspirations supposedly has a high probability of success in engendering democratization; participants and leaders of freedom-motivated movements are dedicated and thus not tempted by economic benefits promised by autocrats, or containable by repression in the long-run. 22 As people increasingly emphasize self-expression values, autocracies face growing "suppression costs" leading to intra-elite tensions and antiregime movements. When the regime can no longer bear these costs, democratization occurs. Mishler and Rose 2007; Muller and Seligson 1994; Rohrschneider 1994; Rustow 1970. Indeed, some consider this an inherent feature of the democratic consolidation process; "with consolidation, democracy becomes routinized and deeply internalized in social, institutional, and even psychological life" Linz and Stepan 1996, 5. 40 Sniderman 1975. to apply a "sober, second thought"; values such as tolerance are therefore "learned best when citizens are exposed to the rough-and-tumble of democratic politics". Following Lipset, several scholars replicated the income-democracy correlation using more data, alternative controls and more complex estimation techniques. 50 The correlation wasoften implicitly -taken as evidence that income enhances democratization prospects and stabilizes existing democracies. However, Przeworski and Limongi altered the conventional knowledge, reporting that income only enhances democratic stability and not democratization. 51 Even more dramatically, Acemoglu and co-authors argue that the incomedemocracy relationship is not causal at all; the correlation disappears when controlling for country-fixed effects. 52 Although later analysis suggests that this stems from fixed effects models being inefficient for slow-moving variables, it casts doubt on classic modernization 50 E.g., Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994 . 51 Przeworski and Limongi 1997; see also Gassebner et al. 2012; but, see Boix and Stokes 2003;  theory's most central relationship. 53 One interpretation is that different historical experiences -for instance concerning institutions built during colonial rule -explain why some countries embarked on paths of economic development and democracy while others did not.
Inferring from cross-country correlations to a causal relationship is at least equally problematic for values and democracy. however, concerned with result-sensitivity when estimating such a large, complex system on so few observations. The authors do not report any robustness tests for their chosen specification.
Research design, imputation model, and data
In contrast to previous studies employing cross-section data, we mainly use panel data to study whether self-expression values affect democracy. This has three major advantages.
First, it expands the number of data points. Second, it allows controlling for country-fixed effects, which reduces risks of omitted variable bias, and may also -although we are not focusing on this here -alleviate measurement equivalence problems. predominantly experience democratization. Although the first pattern holds in the sample, the second does not: For countries scoring below-median on SEI, 80 percent of changes were towards more democratic regimes (using FHI) between the second and third (alternatively fourth if not participating in third) WVS waves. The equivalent number is actually even higher (about 85 percent) for the lower quartile of SEI observations. Furthermore, Figure 1 showed that positive or negative changes in SEI were not systematically associated with particular changes in FHI either. However, these are only bivariate patterns, and we investigate the values-democracy relationship more thoroughly below. Cross-country OLS models utilize limited information -and arguably the wrong type of information (see below) -since it disregards developments within countries over time. The imputation model allows predicting SEI in years it is missing, and we run OLS models with panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) using country-year as unit. 76 Models A7 (EDI) and A8
(FHI) include similar controls to the cross-section models to facilitate comparison. Including time-series variation strengthens the result again; SEI is now significant at 0.1 percent for countries. We could have entered three additional controls from IW's list, but this strongly reduces the sample. However, Models B1 and B2 (with imputed data, Table 2 ) contain all controls. 75 To ensure (some) directly relevant information for predicting SEI, we only include countries having participated in ≥1 of the first five WVS waves.
76 Beck and Katz, 1995. EDI, as the standard error drops when including time-series information. Still, SEI remains insignificant (t=0.58) when using FHI.
77
IW proposed more controls than included in Table 1 , namely the Gini income inequality index, government welfare expenditure─army expenditure, and exports per capita. We excluded these above due to few degrees of freedom, but including them is less problematic when using imputed data and time-series information. The extended models are B1 (EDI) and B2 (FHI) in Table 2 . All models in Table 2 These results on how democratic history both shapes prospects for current democracy and self-expression values point further towards the above-discussed endogeneity problem.
Previous studies using cross-country correlations for inferring that self-expression values produce democracy may simply have picked up a reverse causal effect, which is congruent with the above-discussed literature on institutional learning. The endogeneity of values should thus be accounted for before concluding on whether they affect regime type. To mitigate such endogeneity biases, we run Arellano-Bond GMM models. Importantly, these models account both for endogeneity of values and country-fixed effects. 86 Furthermore, FE models are less efficient when time series are relatively short. Although our FE models do draw on time-84 Lindberg 2006.
85 Gerring et al. 2005. 86 The Sargan test far from rejects the exclusion restriction in Model B7, indicating it provides a proper framework for inferring about causal effects. Yet, the Sargan-test p-value for B8 is low. Since low pvalues can also stem from heteroskedasticity, Sargan-tests for two-step Arellano-Bond models more appropriately test the specification. For these models, the Sargan-tests indicate that the exclusion restriction holds also for B8.
series of 21 years, Arellano-Bond models are therefore arguably more appropriate. We ran several Arellano-Bond specifications, for instance varying the lag structure, but did not find any positive effect of SEI on either EDI or FHI. For example, Models B7 (EDI) and B8 (FHI)
in Table 2 -using 7-year lags and including countries with SEI observations from ≥2 WVS waves -report minuscule t-values of 0.02 and -0.27, respectively. Still, Arellano-Bond models perform sub-optimally for slow-moving variables. Blundell and Bond, using Monte
Carlo simulations, show that system GMM models perform better in such contexts. 87 These models still account for country-specific effects, and augment the Arellano-Bond instrumentation strategy when dealing with endogenous regressors. Interestingly, later studies report that the null-results on income and democracy from Acemoglu et al. are altered -rather identifying a positive effect -when using system GMM models. 88 Likewise, such models recover an effect of education on democracy in system GMM models where FE models yield none. 89 Perhaps also values affect regime type, but our FE and Arellano-Bond models fail to pick this up because values and democracy levels change slowly, leading us to conduct Type II errors? This is, however, not the case. Self-expression values do not affect democracy according to the system GMM Models B9 (EDI; t=0.97) and B10 (FHI; t=-0.15).
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All (non-)results in Models B3-B10 are robust. SEI remains insignificant when removing outliers and influential observations; when using Polity as democracy measure; when testing 1-, 5-or 8-year lags; and, when applying different sample-inclusion criteria. The results are also retained when adding year dummies to control for time trends. Throughout, we have 87 Blundell and Bond 1998.
88 ; e.g., Heid, Langer and Larch 2012.
89 Acemoglu et al. 2005; Castelló-Climent 2008. 90 The results are robust, and retained, e.g., when restricting number of lags used for instrumentation to mitigate the "too-many-instruments problem " Roodman 2009 (see Appendix) .
operationalized values with SEI from IW. We re-ran our models using the values index from
Norris, but still find non-significant results. 91 In sum, when accounting for endogeneity and country-fixed effects, neither choice of democracy measure nor other specification choices matter; there is simply no evidence that self-expression values causally affect regime type. Table 2 shows stronger results for other potential determinants of democracy that are entered as controls. Once accounting for country-fixed effects, Democratic Tradition is robustly related to current democracy levels, and even changes in democracy according to the GMM models. Welfare spending-military spending is positive significant in several models, and so is Protestants-Muslims. Interestingly, also socio-economic resources affects democracy in many models. Although not robust, this lends some support to classic modernization theory. Gassebner et al. 2012. democratic neighborhood) and domestic elite factors (military leader; fuel exports, providing elites with resources to repress and co-opt). Some determinants are retained in panel models akin to those above; using system GMM models, Aslaksen finds that an oil-dependent economy harms democracy. 94 We re-ran our Table 2 models (see Appendix Section B.III), but including fuel exports; we also find some support for the "political resource curse" thesis, although this is not robust in GMM models. Finally, concerning international-political factors, we re-ran our models including WAVE from Knutsen -registering whether or not a country's last regime change was within one of Huntington's reverse waves of democratization.
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WAVE, which taps exogenous sources of democratization from the geo-political climate and regional diffusion effects, is often highly significant. Thus, while self-expression values are unrelated to democracy, some international-political factors and features affecting the capacities and strategies of domestic elites are.
The endogeneity issue revisited: Does experience with democracy affect values?
To reiterate, there is no effect of self-expression values on democracy once accounting for country-fixed effects and the endogeneity of values. We have, however, not yet presented any positive evidence for the assertion that democracy causes self-expression values. To more directly investigate this, we also tested system GMM models with SEI as dependent variable and lagged democracy and either Democratic Tradition or Democratic Stock as independent (see Table 3 ). FHI and EDI are generally positive in different specifications, and sometimes statistically significant, but not robust. In contrast, Democratic Tradition and Democratic 94 Aslaksen 2010. 95 Knutsen 2011.
Stock are always positive and very robust. A long democratic history shapes values in a more liberal direction, as institutional learning theory anticipates.
[ This is not very surprising to us, given the above discussion on how factors other than those highlighted by RTM, notably including international political and domestic elite-level factors, have constituted the main drivers of many democratization experiences.
However, and far more surprising, self-expression values do not stabilize existing democracies either. Indeed, three of our six models in Appendix Table B .1 show a negative point-estimate, and -although the model using 7-year lags and high FHI threshold shows a weakly significant association -the relationship is always insignificant at 5 percent.
Despite the widely accepted arguments on how self-expression values enhance democratization and democratic survival, the results above simply reflect that most countries have not followed the theoretically suggested patterns. One illustrative example is South Africa. Although there was mass mobilization prior to the transition, the pacted nature of the transition following Apartheid -ensuring that rich, white elites would keep their property while, in practice, transferring political power to ANC elites -was critical in allowing for democratization. In contrast, Venezuela experienced a small increase in SEI leading up to 97 Boogards 2012.
98 Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland 2010. Hugo Chavez' consolidation of presidential power, but still experienced reversed democratization under Chavez with the curtailing of civil liberties and electoral manipulation.
Chavez drew notable popular support from the masses because of promises of redistribution, perhaps suggesting that material benefits rather than self-expression values drive popular preferences for regime type. 99 Belarus experienced a fairly large increase in SEI from 1990 to
2008, but the regime's ties to Russia and extensive repression helped it avoid democratization.
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A few countries -notably ex-communist countries such as Lithuania -have followed the 101 Levitsky and Way 2010. cases that fit the pattern, like Lithuania (or even the Czech Republic), it is difficult to establish that the extensiveness of self-expression values was a prerequisite for popular collective action, and to identify the relative importance of popular action compared to other factors, such as external influence.
Extension II: Components of self-expression values
Despite the null-results above, certain SEI-components could affect democracy, but not others. Indeed, the components may tap fairly different things, and perhaps, e.g., social trust affects democracy whereas life satisfaction does not. 102 Yet, we find little evidence for this:
We re-ran the models in Table 2 , sequentially substituting the five components for SEI (see
Appendix Section B.II).
No FE or GMM models show even weakly significant effects. Postmaterialism and happiness are always unrelated to democracy, whereas tolerance is positively related, but only in the PCSE (significant 5 percent) and RE (10 percent) models using EDI.
However, civic action -reporting whether people have or would consider signing a petitionis the strongest. Independent of the democracy measure used, it is significant at 1 percent in PCSE models and 10 percent in RE models. This is interersting in light of our discussion of collective action problems; it is the only indicator relating directly to political actions, and not only values or perceptions. Yet, also civic action is insignificant in FE and GMM models; we cannot conclude that it causally affects democracy. Importantly, signing petitions is likely endogenous, since such activities carry less risk for citizens in democracies than in autocracies.
Further, generalized trust is actually always negatively signed, although only significant in the PCSE model using FHI. This finding is particularly interesting, given the large literature on 102 Hadenius and Teorell 2006; Muller and Seligson 1994. generalized trust/'social capital' and democracy. Whereas some authors propose that the observed positive correlation comes from high trust generating democratic improvements, others argue that it mainly stems from citizenries living under democratic institutions building trust. 103 Corroborating Muller and Seligson, we find no evidence that trusting citizens enhance democracy levels. 104 Moreover, we tested dynamic probit models, finding that trusting citizens neither induce democratization nor stabilize existing democracies.
Conclusion
The analysis above finds no evidence that self-expression values enhance democracy levels, democratization prospects, or democratic durability. Hence, we doubt the popular proposition that having a relatively liberal population is a requirement for viable democracy. We propose that previous conclusions on a strong effect may have been driven by a combination of sample selection-, omitted variable-, and endogeneity biases. Critics might interject that the above results are non-credible because of the missing data and our reliance on multiple imputationdespite the good performance of our imputation model. Our conclusions are, of course, associated with uncertainty. But, poor data coverage is a problem pertaining to the wider literature and is not unique to our analysis. In the absence of broader data coverage and new studies, skeptics should follow standard norms of scientific inference and conclude that there is currently little empirical evidence available for a positive effect of self-expression values on democracy. In other words, the absence of actual data should not lead to concluding in favor of any positive relationship; it is inappropriate to reject the null-hypothesis of no relationship between values and democracy based on studies using limited data and not accounting for important sources of bias.
We document above that the observed relationship between self-expression values and democracy dwindles when including multiple relevant controls, or when accounting for country-fixed effects. The latter result is strikingly robust and suggests that deeper politicalhistorical or geographical factors determine both a country's level of self-expression values and democracy. Moreover, we find evidence indicating that countries' prior historical experiences with democracy and regional diffusion effects contribute to explaining why some countries today are both democratic and have liberal populations, whereas others are autocratic with illiberal populations. We also present analyses distinguishing between democratization and democratic survival. We find that citizenries with more self-expression values neither enhance the survival of existing democracies, nor improve democratization chances. The latter result suggests that the model of IW -assuming a strong and consistent effect of self-expression values on democratization through collective action -is too simple to capture the dynamics of institutional change in autocracies. In line with recent literature on authoritarian survival, regime change requires more than a public preference for freedom and autonomy, in the face of autocrats exhibiting deep pockets and controlling the guns. Rather, we highlight how the cross-country correlation between self-expression values and democracy stems from democratization processes being triggered by other factors -such as international interventions, coups, or bargains between elite groups -and that the subsequently established democratic institutions gradually nurture a more freedom-oriented citizenry inclined to appreciate and defend democracy. p<0.01, *** p<0.001; standard errors in parentheses. Models A1-A6 are OLS on cross-country data. Models A7-A10 are OLS PCSE with errors adjusted for panel-specific AR(1) autocorrelation and heteroskedastic panels. Following IW, the dependent variable is measured in late-1990s or early-2000s in OLS models; control variables are measured for similar years as IW, and SEI and independent FHI-variable are lagged 7 years. Models A5-A10 include imputed data; coefficients are averaged over five imputed samples and errors are imputation-corrected. Imputed observations in A6-A7 are measured in 1995. Maximum time series (dependent variable) in Models A7-A10 is 1988-2009; independent variables are lagged 7 years. Data are from 58 countries with ≥2 SEI-observations. Coefficients are averaged over five imputed samples, and errors are imputation-corrected. Errors are adjusted for panel-specific AR(1) autocorrelation and heteroskedastic panels in PCSE models, and clustered on country in Fixed Effects models. Arellano-Bond and system GMM models consider socioeconomic resources, public spending and SEI endogenous. Maximum time series (dependent variable) is 1988-2009; independent variables are lagged 7 years. 
